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On the Sixtieth Anniversary of the
Communications Act of 1934
Joel Rosenbloom*
To celebrate an event's anniversary, as we do here, is to assert its
continuing importance. One might well ask, however, what this celebration
is about. It is quite arguable that the 1934 Act was an event of only passing
importance in the history of communications law and regulation. The chief
substantive provisions of the statute were taken, lightly adapted, from ear-
lier statutes. Title II's scheme for the regulation of common carriers came
from the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 (by way of the Mann-Elkins Act
of 1910); Title III's provisions for the regulation of broadcast and other
users of the electromagnetic spectrum came from the Radio Act of 1927.'
The argument could be extended. Fundamental innovations in any
field of human endeavor are few and far between. The "public trustee"
concept of broadcasting created in 1927 is with us still, despite the
deregulatory movement of the eighties and the demise of the Fairness
Doctrine.' Moreover, basic innovations need not stem from legislation. The
FCC substituted "price cap" for "rate base/rate of return" regulation of rates
charged by major telecommunications carriers without any change in the
1934 Act.3 The notion that maximum "diversification" in the ownership
* Partner, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Washington, D.C. B.A. University of Illinois,
1951; J.D. Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington, 1954.
1. See Glen 0. Robinson, The Federal Communications Act: An Essay on Origins and
Regulatory Purpose, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934
3, 3-5 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989).
2. The "public trustee" obligations emphasized by the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC or Commission) have varied markedly over time. The FCC no longer
stresses programming and commercial promises or the ascertainment of community needs.
It focuses instead on the commercial and programming requirements of the Children's
Television Act, as well as equal employment and the avoidance of "actionable" indecency.
But the basic concept remains. Indeed, the FCC's new Chairman recently proposed to
"redefine, restate and renew the social compact between the public and the broadcasting
industry." Kim McAvoy, Hundt's New Deal, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug. 1, 1994, at
6, 6.
3. See In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, Further Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 3 FCC Rcd. 3195 (1988), Report and Order and Second Further
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
and control of broadcasting and other mass media is an important public
interest objective was invented by the FCC, not by Congress.4
There remains, nonetheless, reason for this anniversary celebration.
The principal innovation of the 1934 Act was its creation of the FCC as the
unitary regulator of both telecommunications common carriage and the use
of the radio spectrum.' "[T]he two regulatory functions did not have that
much in common, then or now,"6 but the merger of functions itself has had
significant consequences (or so I would argue).
One such effect is easily demonstrable. When Congress merged the
two regulatory schemes, it inserted in its definition of the term "common
carrier" the statement that "a person engaged in radio broadcasting shall
not, insofar as such person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier." 7
Whether other transmitters of interstate communications by wire or radio
would be subject to regulation under Title II of the Act was left to depend
on the uncertain application of traditional notions of what constitutes
"common carriage."' Broadcasters were given a blanket exemption.
In taking this step, Congress resolved a live controversy. Because
broadcasters occupied what were then thought to be highly limited radio
frequencies, there was major concern that they would deny access to their
facilities altogether or discriminate unfairly among those who sought a
Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 4 FCC Rcd. 2873 (1989), Second Report and Order, 5 FCC
Rcd. 6786 (1990), Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 6 FCC Rcd. 2637
(1991), aff'd sub nom. National Rural Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 988 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
4. The roots of the notion, of course, lie in antitrust thought (in its Brandeis/Jefferson
version). But the "diversification" concept goes well beyond any requirements that might
be imposed under antitrust statutes. It was clearly articulated, moreover, well before Justice
Black's dictum in Associated Press v. United States that the antitrust laws serve the First
Amendment by promoting "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse
and antagonistic sources." Associated Press, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); see, e.g., In re Radio
Corp. of Am., 10 F.C.C. 212, 213 (1943) ("IT]he mechanism of free speech can operate
freely only when the controls of public access to the means for the dissemination of news
and issues are in as many responsible ownerships as possible and each exercises its own
independent judgment.").
5. See Robinson, supra note 1, at 3.
6. Id. at 4.
7. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 3, 48 Stat. 1064, 1065 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1988)).
8. See, e.g., In re Amendment of § 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regs.
(Second Computer Inquiry), Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, paras. 121-22, modified by
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980), aff'd and clarified by
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Further Reconsideration, 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981),
aff'd sub nom. Computer and Comm. Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983), aff'd on second further reconsideration, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 301 (1984).
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radio microphone.9 The Senate committee on the 1927 radio legislation
reported out a provision that would have classified as "a common carrier
in interstate commerce" any broadcaster who sold time for any purpose or
who allowed the use of his facilities either by political candidates or for the
discussion of "any question affecting the public."'0 Although that proposal
was rejected on the floor of the Senate," the statute as enacted authorized
the new Radio Commission to revoke any station license if the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) (or "any other Federal body in the exercise
of authority conferred upon it by law") found that a licensee properly
subject to traditional common carrier obligations (e.g., to "provide
reasonable facilities" and avoid "discrimination") had violated those
obligations.'2
As was predicted at the time, that provision turned out to be
ineffective because the ICC disclaimed jurisdiction over radio. 3 But the
notion that broadcasters should be regulated as common carriers was
included in a bill, which would have created an agency exercising
jurisdiction over both "wire and wireless" communication, on which there
were extensive hearings in 1929 and 1930.14 That idea, moreover, had the
support of the Radio Commission's Chairman.'5 The opponents of
common carrier regulation for broadcasters (who included the majority of
the Radio Commission and Senator Dill, one of the co-authors of the Radio
Act) did not talk of broadcaster rights or editorial freedom. Instead, they
emphasized the practical need that broadcasters retain editorial discretion
over the use made of the limited broadcast time at their disposal. 6 Louis
9. See, e.g., 69 CoNG. REc. 5558 (1926) ("If the strong arm of the law does not
prevent monopoly ownership and make discrimination by such stations illegal, American
thought and American politics will be largely at the mercy of those who operate these
stations.").
10. S. REP. No. 772, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1926); see also 69 CONG. REC. 12,503
(1926).
11. See 69 CONG. REc. 12,501-02 (1926).
12. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162, 1168, repealed by Communications Act
of 1934, ch. 652, § 602(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1102.
13. See 69 CONG. REc. 2567 (1927); see also Sta-Shine Prod. Co. v. Station WGBB,
188 I.C.C. 271 (1932).
14. Commission on Communications: Hearings on S. 6 Before the Senate Comm. on
Interstate Commerce, 71st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 1-2 (1929-30) [hereinafter Hearings on
S. 6].
15. See id. at 189-95, 1614-17.
16. See id. at 75, 87-89, 104, 241, 1715, 1757. See also the remark of Senator Dill in
the congressional debates on the 1927 Act concerning the undesirability of putting the
broadcaster "under the hampering control of being a common carrier and compelled to
accept anything and everything that was offered him so long as the price was paid." 69
CONG. REc. 12,502 (1926); and see his remark in 1929:
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Caldwell, who had been the first General Counsel of the Federal Radio
Commission, opposed common carrier status as follows:
If the broadcasting station which ordinarily has to rely on advertisers
for its income has to receive every advertiser on an equal basis, it, and
its listening public may be the prey to all sorts of quack advertising,
and it is felt that it is safer to allow the station owner the same
discretion which a newspaper or magazine has-that of rejecting or
accepting advertising, and relying on his self-interest to see to it that
no unfairness is done.'
7
Whatever their arguments, the supporters of broadcaster discretion
prevailed. Their victory, sealed in Section 3(h) of the 1934 Act, cast a long
shadow into the future. Almost four decades later, the country was torn by
internal divisions concerning the war in Vietnam, as well as those of race,
class, generation, and ideology. The impartiality and integrity of broadcast
journalists was sharply questioned by avatars of both the right and the left.
The Fairness Doctrine had been the FCC's traditional answer to fears on
this score, but its requirement that broadcasters provide reasonable
opportunity for the expression of conflicting views left broadcasters with
broad editorial discretion-too much to satisfy the passions then abroad in
the land. Moreover, in affirming the constitutionality of the Fairness
Doctrine, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, had strongly hinted that more
stringent intrusions could be justified."
In this context, an activist court of appeals found in the First
Amendment a requirement that broadcasters must accept paid advertise-
ments in which the proponents of views on controversial issues could
express those views, select the issues to be discussed, and control the
manner of the overall presentation. 9 In CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National
[I]n theory I have agreed for a long time with the idea that all broadcasting
stations should be common carriers, but in practice I have never been able to
convince myself that it could be worked out without seriously breaking down the
radio service, and that is why I have never insisted upon it.
Hearings on S. 6, supra note 14, at 193.
17. Hearings on S. 6, supra note 14, at 87-88. Caldwell did not rely solely on the
broadcaster's self-interest. He responded to a request for his opinion with respect to
broadcast advertising of cigarettes and "the broad subject of going into the home with the
creation of a habit which, if not deleterious, is at least not beneficial" by asserting that the
Commission could take the broadcast of such advertising into account when passing on the
broadcaster's license renewal. Id. at 88-89.
18. Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The Court said, "[A]s far as the First Amendment
is concerned those who are licensed stand no better than those to whom licenses are
refused." Id. at 389. Further, "[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of
the broadcasters, which is paramount." Id. at 390.
19. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 646 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
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Committee, the Supreme Court rejected that holding.2" In doing so, it
relied on Section 3(h), which it read (in light of its history) as reflecting
"Congress' flat refusal to impose a 'common carrier' right of access for all
persons wishing to speak out on public issues."'21 The Court went well
beyond the discussion of practicalities that had dominated the pre-1934
debate on this subject:
Nor can we accept the Court of Appeals' view that every
potential speaker is "the best judge" of what the listening public ought
to hear or indeed the best judge of the merits of his or her views. All
journalistic tradition and experience is to the contrary. For better or for
worse, editing is what editors are for; and editing is selection and
choice of material. That editors-newspaper or broadcast-can and do
abuse this power is beyond doubt, but that is no reason to deny the
discretion Congress provided.'
This passage represents, I believe, the first instance in which any court
found the screening editorial function performed by mass media worthy of
protection under the First Amendment.23 To be sure, the Court's recogni-
tion of broadcaster editorial rights was nowhere near as sweeping as the
protection it soon thereafter gave to print editors.24 It relied heavily on the
constraints imposed on broadcasters by the Fairness Doctrine,' and left
room for the creation of limited rights of access to the facilities of
broadcasters.26 But CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee estab-
lished the proposition that the constitutional need to preserve broadcasters'
editorial discretion imposes a limit on the scope and nature of any
obligations that the government may impose.
This is not the only effect that Section 3(h) has had on media
regulation. The belief that it is undesirable for media editors to stand as
filters between would-be speakers and the public has had strong appeal in
20. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
21. Id. at 110; see also id. at 132, 137 (Stewart, J., concurring). While resolving a
constitutional rather than statutory question, the Court gave "great weight to the decisions
of Congress." Id. at 102.
22. Id. at 124-25.
23. The right of an editor to reject proffered material is sometimes viewed as part of
the broader right of any speaker to remain silent. Even on this view, CBS, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee antedated Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)
and Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 113-15 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 948
(1982). It was anticipated only by Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, 244 N.E.2d 250,
253 (1968) and, if read broadly, West Virginia State Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943).
24. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
25. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Committee, 412 U.S. at 130-32.
26. See id. at 131-32; see also CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981) (upholding a
statutory right of access to broadcaster facilities for candidates for federal office).
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a variety of contexts. That appeal increases when there appears to be little
constraint on a medium's capacity to deliver the messages of multiple
speakers. When the FCC first recognized that cable television offered a
potential "economy of abundance" in the channels of video service that the
public might receive, 7 the agency toyed with the idea of imposing
"common carrier" status, at least as to some channels.25 In 1972, it
imposed "access" requirements for the benefit of government, educational
institutions, and would-be speakers via cable generally, both commercial
and noncommercial. 9
The agency's authority over cable, however, then rested on the
holding in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co. that Section 2(a) of the
1934 Act granted jurisdiction over cable television "reasonably ancillary to
the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for
the regulation of television broadcasting. In FCC v. Midwest Video
Corp., the Supreme Court struck down the Commission's cable access rules
on the ground that: (i) "[Section] 3(h), consistently with the policy of the
Act to preserve editorial control of programming in the licensee, forecloses
any discretion in the Commission to impose access requirements amounting
to common carrier obligations on broadcast systems,"'" and (ii) Congress
could not be deemed to have authorized the imposition on cable operators
of restrictions that it had sternly forbidden in the case of broadcasters.32
The statutory ban on Commission attempts to constrain the program-
ming discretion of cable operators was limited to intrusions which were so
severe as to amount to the imposition of common carrier status.33
27. In re Amendment of Subpart K of Part 74 of the Commission's Rules and Regs.
with Respect to Tech'l Stds. for Community Antenna TV Sys., Notice of Proposed Rule
Making, 25 F.C.C.2d 38, para. 6 (1970). The Commission had in fact perceived this
possibility at least two years earlier. See generally In re Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K,
of the Commission's Rules and Regs. Relative to Community Antenna TV Sys., Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.2d 417, para. 4 (1968) [hereinafter
CA TV Rulemaking].
28. CATVRulemaking, supra note 27, para. 26.
29. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, paras. 122-25, 130-48,240-42
app. (1972). Two years later, a committee of the President's cabinet proposed that cable
operators be generally divorced from any control over the content they distributed, i.e., that
they be subjected to full common carrier regulation. THE CABINET COMMITTEE ON CABLE
COMMUNICATIONS, OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY, REPORT To THE PRESIDENT
(1974).
30. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968).
31. Midwest Video, 440 U.S. 689, 705 (1979).
32. Id. at 708.
33. Id. at 706-07 n.16 (distinguishing the Commission's then-existing rules requiring
cable operators to carry the signals of local TV broadcasters, on the ground that they "did
not compel cable operators to function as common carriers," were "limited to remedying a
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Moreover, Midwest Video was far from the final word on the subject. The
access requirements stricken by the Court in 1979 were substantially
restored by the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984. 34 But the idea
that the programming discretion of cable operators is entitled to respect was
given a powerful boost by Midwest Video. That discretion has since been
given First Amendment protection, most recently and authoritatively in
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC.
35
We seem today on the cusp of an era marked by the convergence of
technologies (and players) in telecommunications carriage, data processing,
cable television, and broadcasting. In an era in which channels of
communication to the public will be, as a practical matter, infinite,
television viewing will become increasingly interactive, and "systems
integrators" will play as large a role as the purveyors of content or the
providers of transport services.36 But there is no indication that fears of
media power and fascination with its presumed ability to shape our society
for good or ill will disappear. Nor is there much evidence that Congress or
the courts will reject all rationales for the use of regulatory power to
constrain the editorial choices of the electronic media. It is a matter of
some moment, then, that any form of such regulation will have to leave
electronic media editors with "abundant discretion over programming
choices."37 We owe that feature of our jurisprudence in no small part to
one of the decisions made in 1934.
specific perceived evil," and "involved a balance of considerations not addressed by
§ 3(h))-"
34. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, § 2, 47 U.S.C. § 532 (1988). This
section, dealing with commercial leased access, was significantly broadened by the Cable
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, §§ 9, 10(a)-(b), 47 U.S.C. § 532 (Supp.
IV 1992).
35. TurnerBrdcst., 114 S. Ct. 2445, reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. 30 (1994). The protection
afforded by Turner fell well short of the cable industry's hopes. But it remains unclear
whether the broadcast signal carriage requirements imposed by the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, which are plainly not threatened by
anything in Midwest Video, will ultimately survive the further scrutiny that Turner
mandates.
36. See, e.g., Eli Noam, Beyond Liberalization: From the Network of Networks to the
System of Systems, 18 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL'Y 286-94 (May/June, 1994).
37. Turner Brdcst., 114 S. Ct. at 2464.
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